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Abstrat
In dynami prinipal-agent relationships, it is sometimes observed
that the agent's reward depends only on the nal outome. For ex-
ample, a student's grade in a ourse quite often depends only on the
nal exam sore, where the performane in the problem sets and the
mid-term exam is ignored. The present paper shows that suh an
arrangement an be optimal if the agent's eort in eah period has
strong persistent eets. It is shown that the optimality of suh a
simple payment sheme ruially depends on the rst order stohasti
dominane of the nal outome under various eort sequenes.

This paper is based on Chapter 2 of my Ph. D. thesis (University of Tokyo, 2008).
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1 Introdution
In long-term prinipal-agent relationships, the prinipal write payment shed-
ules that an potentially depend on period-by-period performane (that is
related to the level of eorts), in order to provide proper inentives. In the
light of the elebrated SuÆient Statisti Theorem (Holmstrom [3℄), one may
expet that using the detailed history of past performanes that is informa-
tive of the agent's eorts is optimal for the prinipal in writing payment
shedules.
However, we often observe various inentive shemes whih are not depen-
dent on a part of performanes, although those performanes would provide
ertain information about the agent's eort levels. Espeially, examples of
inentive sheme that depends only on the nal performane are abundant.
For instane, in many undergraduate ourses, the instrutors' grading
poliy mainly fouses on sores in the nal exam, although week-by-week
homework may reet students' eort levels in detail. Other examples in-
lude university admissions in Japan that are ompletely dependent on en-
trane exams, where high-shool reords are hardly taken into onsideration
in admission proess. Private tutors in Japan for entrane exams are often
ompensated with speial bonus if the student has ahieved the nal obje-
tive, while usual tutorial fees are xed, and do not depend on the students'
period-by-period performane.
The present paper shows that suh an arrangement an be optimal if the
agent's eort in eah period has strong persistent eets. If agent's eort
in eah period has strong persistent eet on the probability distribution of
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outomes in later periods, the payment ontrat whih depends only on the
nal outome an provide the agent with suÆient inentive to work harder
in every period. Therefore, all outomes exept for the nal-period one are
ignored in the optimal long-term ontrat, although those outomes would
provide detailed information about agent's eort levels in preeding periods.
Theorems 1{3 of the paper provide suÆient onditions for suh simple
ontrats to be optimal in various models of dynami moral hazard irum-
stane in whih the ost of eort is the same in all periods. The ommon
feature of our suÆient onditions an be simply summarized as follows:
The probability distribution of the nal outome when the agent shirks only
in the nal period rst-order stohastially dominates (FOS-dominates or
FOSD, hereafter) the distribution when the agent shirks in any other pe-
riods in suh a way that the expeted number of shirking is one. To grasp
the idea behind this ondition intuitively, onsider the two-period model in
whih the agent's rst-period ation also aets the probability distribution
of the seond-period outome. Let (a; a
0
) denote the ation prole in whih
the rst element (seond element) indiates the agent's rst period ation
(seond period ation, respetively), and let a (a) denote the high eort
(the shirk, respetively). Then the suÆient ondition has the following two
requirements (Theorem 1).
(i) The probability distribution of the seond-period outome when the
agent shirks only in the seond period (a; a) FOS-dominates the distri-
bution when the agent shirks only in the rst period (a; a).
(ii) The probability distribution of the seond-period outome when the
agent shirks only in the seond period (a; a) FOS-dominates the half-
by-half randomization of (a) the distribution when the agent shirks in
both periods (a; a) and (b) the distribution when the agent never shirks
in any periods (a; a).
Requirement (i) ensures that shirking in the rst period (a; a) is always worse
3
o to the agent than shirking in the seond period (a; a). Due to the FOSD,
the agent an obtain larger expeted payo from wages in (a; a) than in
(a; a)
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, and as the number of eorts is the same in both ation proles, the
agent obtains larger overall expeted payo if he takes (a; a) than (a; a).
Thus, in designing the optimal ontrat, the prinipal need not take into
aount the possibility that the agent may shirk in the rst period (a; a).
Requirement (ii) ensures that shirking in both periods (a; a) is worse o
to the agent than shirking in the seond period (a; a). As the number of
eorts is dierent between the two alternatives, the FOSD ondition should
be arranged in suh a way that the expeted number of eorts is set to be the
same. In requirement (ii), this is ahieved by setting the expeted number
of eorts of both sides to be one (1 = 0:5 2+ 0:5 0).
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Thus, in designing
the optimal ontrat, the prinipal need not take into aount the possibility
that the agent may shirk in both periods (a; a).
Under (i) and (ii), the prinipal need not take into onsideration any pos-
sibilities that the agent shirks in the rst period whatsoever (a; ). Therefore,
the prinipal's interest is onentrated on inentivizing the agent's seond-
period eort only, whih indues the simple optimal ontrat that depends
only on the nal outome. It is noteworthy that requirement (ii) together
with (i) an be summarized as follows: The probability distribution of the
nal outome when the agent shirks only in the nal period FOS-dominates
the distribution when the agent shirks in any other periods in suh a way
that the expeted number of shirking is one. Suh arguments of the role of
FOSD and the expeted number of eorts also apply to T -period models,
1
As will be presented formally in Setion 3, we assume that the distribution of out-
omes has the monotone likelihood ratio property. Therefore, in the optimal ontrat, the
wage sheme is an inreasing funtion of outomes, whih enables us to make omparison
between expeted payos from wages by means of FOSD.
2
The reader may wonder why (a; a), whih is irrelevant in the omparison between
(a; a) and (a; a), appears in requirement (ii). This is beause the inentive ompatibility
onstraint between (a; a) and (a; a) is binding (indierent to the agent) in the optimum.
See Setion 3 for the detail.
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and suÆient onditions are provided in similar manners (Theorems 2{3).
Strong persistent eets of eorts as haraterized by the FOSDs is the
main soure of our result. Historial dependene of this sort an be often
seen in real eonomi environments. For example, if an eort has a time-lag
eet to the next period as well as the diret eet to the urrent period,
then the probability of suess in period 2 will be inuened by the eort
level in period 1. If the prodution tehnology bears irreversibility, then the
model beomes history dependent in a similar manner.
3
A brief review of the related literature is as follows. The result of the
paper (Theorems 1{3) is in ontrast with the ones in repeated moral hazard
literature that payments in the optimal long-term ontrat should be depen-
dent on the whole history of past performanes (Lambert [5℄, Rogerson [11℄,
Malomson and Spinnewyn [8℄ and Chiappori et al. [1℄). In those literature,
it is assumed that there are no exogenous links between one period and the
next, and the omplementarity between inentives as disussed in preeding
paragraphs annot emerge.
Holmstrom [3℄ shows that any signal that is informative of the agent's
eorts should be used to ondition the agent's ompensation sheme when
there are no exogenous links between ations the agent might take (The
SuÆient Statisti Theorem). In our model, all outomes exept for the
nal-period one should be ignored in the optimal ontrat, although those
outomes are informative of the agent's eorts in the preeding periods. Our
result is in ontrast to Holmstrom's in that some part of \informative" signals
an be ignored in the optimal ontrat if there are exogenous links between
the agent's ations.
After ompleting the earlier version of this paper, we beame aware of
an independent work by Kwon [4℄, who investigates a dynami moral hazard
model and derives a similar result to ours in a sense that the optimal on-
trat should be simple if the probability distributions satisfy \non-inreasing
3
These examples are examined in detail in Setion 4.
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marginal returns" assumption. Kwon deals with a simplied model in whih
there are only two performane levels (\suess" and \failure") and the eet
of eorts in every period is symmetri. The present paper deals with more
general environment in whih there are N performane levels and the ef-
fet of eorts in eah period an be asymmetri, and reveals that onditions
provided with rst-order stohasti dominane is suÆient for the simple
ontrat result, whih is a weaker ondition than Kwon's \non-inreasing
marginal returns" assumption.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Setion 2 desribes
the basi model of 2-period dynami moral hazard. Setion 3 provides the
main result of the paper. It is shown that the optimal long-term ontrat is
dependent only on the nal outome and a suÆient ondition for the result
is presented (Theorem 1). Setion 4 provides some examples of environments
in whih the suÆient ondition is satised. In Setion 5, we extend the basi
model to T -period, and present suÆient onditions for the optimal ontrat
to be simple as in Theorem 1. Setion 6 ontains some onluding remarks.
2 The Basi Model
We study a simple dynami moral hazard model with \history dependene."
The relationship between a prinipal (she) and an agent (he) lasts for two
periods (t = 1; 2).
In eah period, the agent hooses his ation a
t
from the ation spae
A = fa; ag. These ations are kept unobservable to the prinipal. We may
nd it onvenient to interpret those ations as eort levels, and say that he
works hard (respetively, shirks) when he hooses a (respetively, a).
In period t, after the agent has hosen his ation a
t
, the outome x
t
2
4
In Setion 5, it is shown that \non-inreasing marginal returns" is a speial lass of
the suÆient ondition provided with FOSD. Empirial evidene from health insurane is
also presented in Kwon [4℄, whih is onsistent with the derived optimal ontrat.
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fx
1
;    ; x
N
g realizes aording to probabilities that depend on the history of
agent's ations; that is, the distribution of x
1
depends on a
1
, whereas that of
x
2
depends on the pair (a
1
; a
2
). These outomes are immediately observed by
both parties (and assumed to be veriable to third parties, suh as a ourt).
We may regard these outomes as performanes, and identify eah of them
with the orresponding revenue to the prinipal.
We assume that x
1
and x
2
are independently distributed
5
; hereafter, we
will write the distributions as follows:
p
1
i
(a
1
) = Pr

x
1
= x
i
j a
1

(i = 1;    ; N);
p
2
i
(a
1
; a
2
) = Pr

x
2
= x
i
j (a
1
; a
2
)

(i = 1;    ; N):
Throughout the paper, we assume that the distributions are of full supports:
p
1
i
(a
1
) > 0 for all (i; a
1
) 2 f1;    ; Ng  A;
p
2
i
(a
1
; a
2
) > 0 for all (i; a
1
; a
2
) 2 f1;    ; Ng  A
2
:
At the beginning of the game (i.e., before t = 1), the prinipal and the
agent sign a ontrat in the manner desribed in detail below.
First, the prinipal oers a long-term ontrat w = (w
1
;w
2
), where
w
1
= (w
1
(x
1
))
x
1
2X
and w
2
= (w
2
(x
1
; x
2
))
(x
1
;x
2
)2X
2
are payment shedules
for periods 1 and 2, respetively, under outome realizations (x
1
; x
2
). Suh
a ontrat stipulates N + N
2
possible payments, depending on the realiza-
tions of outomes. Next, the agent deides whether to aept or refuse the
ontrat oered by the prinipal. If the agent refuses the oered ontrat,
both parties reeive their reservation utilities, and the game omes to an end.
If the agent aepts the ontrat, the game enters into the two times moral
5
This assumption says that the realized value of x
1
does not inuene the distribution
of x
2
, so that the former yields no information on the urrent likelihood of any partiular
prodution levels in period 2. \History dependene" disussed in this paper treats the
ase where x
2
is aeted by a
1
, but not by the realization of x
1
.
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hazard repetition disussed above.
We assume that the prinipal an ommit to the long-term ontrat that
she has oered before t = 1 and so, one the ontrat is aepted by the
agent, the prinipal annot hange the payment shedule w and must make
the payment eah period aording to the history of outome realizations up
to the date. We also assume that the agent an ommit to his partiipation
to the game and so, one he aepts the ontrat, he annot exit in the midst
of the game and must partiipate in it until the end of period 2.
In eah period, the agent attains a payo of u(w) (a), where u is stritly
inreasing and stritly onave (the agent is risk-averse) and (a) < (a)
(harder work makes more ost). We normalize this as (a) = 0 and (a) = C.
Given a long-term ontrat w, the agent's strategy onsists of two parts:
one is the ation he takes in the rst period, a
1
, and the other is the ation
shedule for the seond period a
2
= (a
2
i
)
N
i=1
, eah of whih speies the ation
he will take in period 2 under the outome realization of x
1
in period 1.
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Let
U
i
(a
1
; a
2
i
;w
2
) denote the expeted utility in period 2 for the agent when he
took a
1
and the outome was x
i
in the rst period:
U
i
(a
1
; a
2
i
;w
2
) =
N
X
j=1
p
2
i
(a
1
; a
2
i
)u(w
2
(x
i
; x
j
))  (a
2
i
):
Using this notation, the intertemporal expeted utility for the agent U(a
1
; a
2
;w)
under the agent's strategy (a
1
; a
2
) an be written as
U(a
1
; a
2
1
;    ; a
2
N
;w) =
N
X
i=1
p
1
i
(a
1
)

u(w
1
(x
i
)) + U
i
(a
1
; a
2
i
;w
2
)

  (a
1
):
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6
Aordingly, we allow the agent to hange his ation in period 2 after he observes
the outome realization in period 1, whih is one of the standard assumptions in the
literature. One we ease this assumption and assume that the agent had to ommit to a
pair of ations (a
1
; a
2
) ex ante, then the model redues to a one-shot multitask inentive
problem. We shall take the sequentiality assumption to fous on the dynamis of the
model, but note that the main result of the paper (Theorems 1{3) also apply to the
one-shot multitask model.
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We assume that both the Prinipal and the Agent have the ommon disount fator
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The optimization problem for the prinipal when she wishes to implement
an ation prole (a
1
; a
2
) an now be written as:
min
w
N
X
i=1
p
1
i
(a
1
)
"
w
1
(x
i
) +
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a
1
; a
2
i
)w
2
(x
i
; x
j
)
#
; (P)
subjet to
U(a
1
; a
2
;w)  U(a
0
; a
00
;w); a
0
6= a
1
; 8a
00
2 A
N
; (IC1)
U
i
(a
1
; a
2
i
;w
2
)  U
i
(a
1
; a
0
;w
2
); a
0
6= a
2
i
; i = 1;    ; N; (IC2)
U(a
1
; a
2
;w)  2u; (PC)
where u denotes the reservation utility for the agent.
At this point, we should emphasize how the optimization problem (P)
diers from the one for repeated moral hazard models. When the model is
just a repetition of two moral hazard stages, the ation taken in period 1,
a
1
, does not aet the probability distribution of outomes in period 2 so
that U
i
(a
0
; a
2
i
;w
2
) = U
i
(a
00
; a
2
i
;w
2
) for any a
0
6= a
00
. This would redue the
inentive onstraints for the rst period (IC1) to
U(a
1
; a
2
;w)  U(a
0
; a
2
;w); (a
0
6= a
1
); (IC1
ind
)
under whih we must only take into aount the deviation strategies from a
1
to the other a
0
, with a
2
xed. For the dynami model whih we investigate
in the paper, this would not be suÆient: we must take into aount all
possibilities of deviation the agent might make during the two periods, as it
is no longer assured that he will always take a
2
regardless of the ation he
takes in period 1, even if (IC2) is satised for the a
1
.
of 1. If the ommon disount fator were less than 1 (but positive) and the outome spae
onsists of three elements or more, we annot attain plausible suÆient onditions as in
Assumption 1, whih an be desribed only with the nature of (p
1
i
()) and (p
2
i
(; )). An
independent related paper by Mukoyama and Sahin [8℄ shows in ase of N = 2 that an
extension of Assumption 1 is a suÆient ondition for w
1
(x
1
) to be onstant in a similar
model in whih both players have a ommon disount fator less than 1.
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3 Simple Contrat
In this setion, we show that the optimal long-term ontrat is dependent only
on the seond-period outome if the probability distribution of the seond pe-
riod outome satises ertain onditions as briey disussed in Introdution.
The result (Theorem 1) lies in ontrast to that in the repeated moral hazard
literature where the optimal long-term ontrat would always be dependent
on the whole history of past outomes.
The following assumption gives the suÆient ondition for suh simple
ontrats. We may regard this assumption as \strong persistent eets" in
the sense that the ation hosen in period 1 has a stronger inuene on the
outome in period 2 than the ation hosen in period 2.
Assumption 1. p
2
i
(a
1
; a
2
) satises the following three onditions:
(i) p
2
i
(a
1
; a)=p
2
u
(a
1
; a) is inreasing in i for all a
1
. (MLRC)
(ii)
P
I
i=1
p
2
i
(a; a) 
P
I
i=1
p
2
i
(a; a) for all I 2 f1;    ; Ng.
(iii)
1
2
P
I
i=1
(p
2
i
(a; a) + p
2
i
(a; a)) 
P
I
i=1
p
2
i
(a; a) for all I 2 f1;    ; Ng.
In Assumption 1, (ii) says that the ation prole (a; a) stohastially
dominates the ation prole (a; a) in the distribution of x
2
, while (iii) says
that (a; a) stohastially dominates the half-by-half randomization between
(a; a) and (a; a). We should note that neither (ii) nor (iii) in Assumption 1
an be satised in repeated moral hazard models.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the probability distribution of seond period out-
ome satises Assumption 1. Then the optimal long-term ontrat w whih
implements a
1
= a and a
2
= (a; : : : ; a) is suh that
(a) w
1
(x
1
) is a onstant for all x
1
,
(b) w
2
(x
1
; x
2
) is independent of x
1
, and is inreasing in x
2
.
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We should note here that Assumption 1 is not only a suÆient ondition
for the simple ontrat result, but also almost neessary ondition in the sense
that if the simple ontrat is optimal for any inreasing and onave funtions
u() then the probability distribution neessarily satises Assumption 1.
Proof. The proof proeeds in two steps. In the rst step, we solve a \relaxed"
optimization problem as follows:
min
w
N
X
i=1
p
1
i
(a
1
)
"
w
1
(x
i
) +
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a
1
; a
2
i
)w
2
(x
i
; x
j
)
#
; (P')
subjet to
U
i
(a
1
; a
2
i
;w
2
)  U
i
(a
1
; a
0
;w
2
); a
0
6= a
2
i
; i = 1;    ; N; (IC2)
U(a
1
; a
2
;w)  2u; (PC)
and show that the solution satises the properties (a) and (b). In the seond
step, we verify that (any) ontrat satisfying properties (a) and (b) is always
ompatible with the onstraint (IC1). By these two steps, we an onlude
that the solution to the \original" optimization problem (P) satises prop-
erties (a) and (b).
1. The rst-order ondition for w
1
(x
i
) in the \relaxed" problem (P
0
) is
1
u
0
(w
1
(x
i
))
=  for all x
i
;
where  is the Lagrange multiplier with respet to (PC). Thus, w
1
(x
i
) is a
onstant for all x
i
.
The rst-order ondition for w
2
(x
i
; x
j
) is
1
u
0
(w
2
(x
i
; x
j
))
=

i
p
i
(a)

1 
p
2
j
(a; a)
p
2
j
(a; a)

+ ;
where 
i
is the Lagrange multiplier with respet to (IC2) for the orre-
11
sponding i. Here, w
2
(x
i
; x
j
) is independent of i (otherwise the prinipal
ould be stritly better o by oering the ertainty equivalene ~w
0
j
suh that
u( ~w
0
j
) =
P
i
p
1
i
(a)u(w
2
(x
i
; x
j
)), without aeting the remaining onstraints
(IC2) and (PC)). Hene, the ratio 
i
=p
i
(a) is a onstant for all i.
If 
i
= 0, then w
2
(x
i
; x
j
) would be a onstant for all j, whih violates
(IC2) for i. Hene, 
i
> 0 should be satised for all i, whih means that
(IC2) is binding in the optimum. Therefore, from Assumption 1 (i) and the
onavity of u(), w
2
(x
i
; x
j
) must be inreasing in j.
2. Firstly, we hek that (IC1) is satised for two deviation strategies
(a
1
; a
2
) = (a; a;    ; a) and (a
1
; a
2
) = (a; a;    ; a) under the optimal ontrat
derived in 1. Here, we write w
1
(x
i
) = w
1
and w
2
(x
i
; x
j
) = w
2
j
as the ontrat
is not dependent on x
i
.
As shown in 1., (IC2) is binding at the optimum; therefore,
C =
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
) 
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
) (1)
(IC1) to hold against deviation strategy (a
1
; a
2
) = (a; a;    ; a) is equiv-
alent to
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
)  2C 
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
)  C;
whih, by substituting (1), yields
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
) 
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
):
Sine u(w
2
j
) in inreasing in j, a suÆient ondition for this inequality to hold
is that (a; a) stohastially dominates (a; a) in the probability distribution of
x
2
: Assumption 1 (ii).
(IC1) to hold against deviation strategy (a
1
; a
2
) = (a; a;    ; a) is equiv-
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alent to
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
)  2C 
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
);
whih, by substituting (1), yields
2
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
) 
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
) +
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
):
Likewise a suÆient ondition for this inequality to hold is that (a; a) stohas-
tially dominates the half-by-half randomization between (a; a) and (a; a):
Assumption 1 (iii).
Finally we hek that (IC1) is satised for any deviation strategies (a
1
; a
2
) =
(a; a
2
1
;    ; a
2
N
). Suppose the agent is to take a
2
i
= a if i 2

I  f1;    ; Ng
and a
2
i
= a if i 2 I = f1;    ; Ng n

I. The intertemporal payo to the agent
following this deviation strategy would satisfy
u(w
1
) +
X
i2

I
p
1
i
(a)
"
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
)  C
#
+
X
i2I
p
1
i
(a)
"
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
)
#
 u(w
1
) + max
(
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
)  C;
N
X
j=1
p
2
j
(a; a)u(w
2
j
)
)
= max fU(a; a;    ; a;w); U(a; a;    ; a;w)g
 U(a; a;    ; a;w);
where the last inequality omes from the previous result that (IC1) is satised
both for (a
1
; a
2
) = (a; a;    ; a) and for (a
1
; a
2
) = (a; a;    ; a). Hene, (IC1)
is satised for any deviation strategy (a
1
; a
2
) = (a; a
2
1
;    ; a
2
N
).
The intuition behind the proof is as follows. For the prinipal who is
willing to indue the agent to exert the positive eort a in period 2, it is
neessary to make the seond-period payment w
2
(x
i
; x
j
) dependent on the
seond-period outome x
j
as this is the only soure of inentive power avail-
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able. However, suh a payment shedule would indue the agent to work
hard in period 1 sine the distribution of seond-period outomes is aeted
not only by a
2
but also by a
1
. Moreover, this gives the agent an inentive
enough to work hard in period 1 under Assumption 1: Assumption 1 (ii)
ensures that the agent an always obtain larger gross expeted payo from
wages by ation prole (a; a) than that by (a; a) due to the FOSD, and as
the ost of eort, C, is the same in both periods, the agent obtains larger net
expeted payo as well. Thus, if the ontrat is to indue working hard in
the seond period, it automatially provides the agent with inentive to work
hard in the rst period. Assumption 1 (iii), on the other hand, ensures that
the agent would not deviate to shirking in both periods (i.e., to (a; a)). Half-
by-half randomization of the two probability distributions, (a; a) and (a; a),
gives the agent's gross expeted payo by taking (a; a) in aordane with
the benet of eort ost redution normalized to C (one-time shirk). Thus, if
the ontrat is to indue working hard in the seond period, it automatially
makes the agent worse o if he shirks in both periods, (a; a).
To summarize, if the probability distribution of the seond-period out-
ome when the agent shirks only in the seond period (a; a) FOS-dominates
the distribution when the agent shirks in any other periods in suh a way
that the expeted number of shirking is one, providing inentive to work hard
in the seond period beomes enough to indue the agent to make high eorts
in both periods. As we will see in Setion 5, suh arguments of FOSD and
one-time shirk play entral roles in T -period models as well and the suÆient
onditions for simple ontrats are provided in similar manners.
4 Examples
In this setion, we give a few examples in whih p
2
i
(; ) satises Assumption 1.
These examples inorporate \strong persistent eets" in the sense that the
ation hosen in period 1 has a stronger inuene on the outome of period
14
2 than the ation hosen in period 2. Under suh irumstanes, the optimal
long-term ontrat is simple by whih we mean that the payment shedule
would be dependent only upon the seond-period outome.
In the following examples, we suppose N = 2 (\suess" and \failure")
and let 
t
() denote the probability of \suess" in period t; that is, 
t
() =
p
t
2
() and 1  
t
() = p
t
1
().
Example 1 (Time lag). There is a time lag between the eort and its eet.
If the agent works hard in period t, it not only inreases the probability of
suess in the same period by  but also inreases the probability of suess
in the following period by . We assume 0 <  <  in whih we an regard
 as a \full eet" of the eort and  as a \partial eet" of the eort. Let 
denote the probability of suess when the agent has never taken any positive
eorts. Then, we an write 
t
() as follows:

1
(a) = ; 
1
(a) =  + ;

2
(a; a) = ; 
2
(a; a) =  + ;

2
(a; a) =  + ; 
2
(a; a) =  +  + :
Assumption 1 (ii) is satised as 
2
(a; a) > 
2
(a; a); this is the \time-lag
eet" sine the positive eort a taken in period 1 has greater inuene 
than it has if taken in period 2 (). Assumption 1 (iii) is also satised as

2
(a; a) >
1
2
[
2
(a; a) + 
2
(a; a)℄.
Example 2 (Irreversibility). The agent has to make a positive eort every
period to maintain the highest probability of suess . If he shirks, the
probability of suess delines by  and this will never be reovered, even if
the agent makes a positive eort in the following period:

1
(a) =    ; 
1
(a) = ;

2
(a; a) =    2; 
2
(a; a) =    

2
(a; a) =    ; 
2
(a; a) = :
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It is lear that the distribution satises Assumption 1 (ii) and (iii) with
equalities.
5 Extensions
In this setion, we extend the basi model to T -period setup, and show that
similar results as in Theorem 1 an be obtained. As in Setion 2, we let
a
t
and x
t
denote agent's ation and outome in eah period t = 1;    ; T ,
respetively. Distribution of eah outome x
t
is dependent on the whole past
history of ations a
t
= (a
1
;    ; a
t
), and we write them as follows:
p
it
(a
t
) = Pr

x
t
= x
i
j a
t

; i = 1;    ; N:
For simpliity, we assume throughout this setion that the agent deides
his whole ation prole a
T
= (a
1
;    ; a
T
) in the beginning of period 1 and he
never hanges this prole after observing any outomes in eah period.
8
We
split the agent's ation spae A
T
= A    A into partition (A
0
; : : : ;A
T
),
where
A
k
=

(a
1
; : : : ; a
T
) j #

t j a
t
= a
	
= k
	
; k = 0; : : : ; T:
That is, A
k
is the set of ation prole a
T
in whih there are k low eorts
a (and hene, T   k high eorts a).
9
For instane, if T = 3, then above
notation gives us A
0
= f(a; a; a)g, A
1
= f(a; a; a); (a; a; a); (a; a; a)g, et.
8
In the basi model of Setion 2, it is assumed that the agent an make his seond
period ation a
2
after observing the rst period outome x
1
; therefore, the ation prole
onsists of N +1 omponents (a
1
; a
2
1
; : : : ; a
2
N
), where a
2
i
denotes the seond period ation
when the rst period outome is x
i
. For T -period model in this setion, we an also think
of possibility that the agent's ations depend on past outomes (in whih ase the ation
prole onsists of (N
T
 1)=(N 1) omponents), but suh a onsideration does not hange
the result in Theorems 2{3. See the Appendix for more on this point.
9
It is obvious that (A
0
; : : : ;A
T
) satises A
k
\ A
l
= ; for any k; l, and
S
k
A
k
= A.
Hene (A
0
;    ;A
T
) is a partition of A.
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Let V (a;w) denote the agent's gross expeted payo from payment shed-
ule w when he takes ation prole a. Then the agent's net expeted payo
an be written as
V (a;w)  C m(a);
where C is the ost of high eort a (as in Setion 2) and m(a) is the number
of high eorts in ation prole a. Then the inentive ompatibility onstraint
in N -period model an be simplied as follows: for k = 1; : : : ; T ,
V (a; : : : ; a;w)  C  k  V (a
0
;w); for all a
0
2 A
k
: (IC
k
)
Here we oer two models of N -period dynami moral hazard.
Extention 1 (Summary outome in the nal period)
Suppose that the agent is to make mutually independent outomes in eah
period, but in the nal period t = T , there will be a \summary" outome
that is dependent on the whole past ations a
t
= (a
1
;    ; a
T
). To be spei,
p
it
(a
t
) = Pr

x
t
= x
i
j a
t

; t = 1;    ; T   1;
p
jt
(a
T
) = Pr

x
T
= x
j
j a
T

:
In this setup, t-period ation a
t
is assumed to aet the urrent outome
x
t
as well as the nal outome x
T
. We an think of this situation as the
relationship between week-by-week homeworks and the nal exam. Eah
week students are assigned homework onerning the topi they have just
studied, but in the end, students must hallenge the nal exam onerning
the entire topi they learned in the semester.
Theorem 2. Suppose that p
jT
(a
T
) satises the following two onditions:
1. p
jT
(a
T 1
; a)=p
jT
(a
T 1
; a) is inreasing in j for all a
T 1
(MLRC),
17
2. For all k = 1; : : : ; T and all a
0
2 A
k
, the inequality
P
J
j=1
[(k   1)p
jT
(a; : : : ; a; a) + p
jT
(a
0
)℄
k

J
X
j=1
p
jT
(a; : : : ; a; a) (2)
holds for all J 2 f1;    ; Ng.
Then payments in the optimal long-term ontrat is dependent only on the
nal outome x
T
.
First note that onditon 2. is the generalization of onditions (ii) and (iii)
in Assumption 1. Substituting k = 1 into equation (2) gives
J
X
j=1
p
jT
(a
0
) 
J
X
j=1
p
jT
(a; : : : ; a; a) for all a
0
2 A
1
and J ,
whih states that the distribution of nal outome x
T
when the agent takes
ation prole (a; : : : ; a; a) rst-order stohastially dominates that of any a-
tion prole a
0
in whih the agent takes low eort only in one period; this
is exatly an extension of ondition (ii) in Assumption 1. Similarly, substi-
tuting k = 2 into inequality (2) provides an extention of ondition (iii) in
Assumption 1. In general, inequality (2) an be seen as the following ondi-
tion: shirking in the nal period (right-hand side) rst-order stohastially
dominates any shirkings whose expeted number is exatly one (left-hand
side).
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we an show that the optimal long-term
ontrat is independent of outome history x
T 1
up to the period T   1, if
all inentive onstraints but
V (a; : : : ; a; a;w)  C  V (a; : : : ; a; a;w) (3)
are not binding. In the following we show that the derived ontrat, whih
is dependent only on the nal outome x
T
, automatially satises all the
18
inentive ompatibility onstraints.
As the derived ontrat w

satises (3) with equality, we have
C = V (a; : : : ; a; a;w

)  V (a; : : : ; a; a;w

): (4)
For eah k = 1; : : : ; T , substituting (4) into (IC
k
) yields
k  V (a; : : : ; a; a;w

)  (k   1)  V (a; : : : ; a; a;w

) + V (a
0
;w

):
This inequality is guaranteed to hold by (2).
Extention 2 (Human Capital Investment)
Suppose that distributions of outome in eah period are dependent not on
the detail of past ations, but on the number of high eorts that the agent
has taken up to the date. To be spei, we let p
i
(k) denote the probability
distribution when the agent has taken k high eorts:
p
i
(k) = Pr

x
t
= x
i
j #

t j a
t
= a
	
= k

; k = 0; : : : ; T:
We an think of this situation as agent's human apital investment or learning-
by-doing eet of agent's eort.
Theorem 3. Suppose that distributions p
i
(k), k = 0; : : : ; T , satisfy the fol-
lowing two onditions:
1. p
i
(T )=p
i
(T   1) is inreasing in i,
2. For all k = 2;    ; T , the inequality
P
J
j=1
[(k   1)p
j
(T ) + p
j
(T   k)℄
k

J
X
j=1
p
j
(T   1)
holds for all J 2 f1; : : : ; Ng.
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Then the optimal long-term ontrat is dependent only on the nal outome
x
T
.
We should note that substituting k = 2 into ondition 2 yields the oun-
terpart of ondition (iii) in Assumption 1.
10
As in Extension 1, ondition 2
an be seen as the following ondition: shirking in the nal period (right-
hand side) rst-order stohastially dominates any shirkings whose expeted
number is one (left-hand side).
It is also important to note that ondition 2 is a reasonable assumption
sine it is a weaker ondition of non-inreasing marginal returns to invest-
ment: for all k = 1; : : : ; T   1,
J
X
j=1
[p
j
(k + 1)  p
j
(k)℄ 
J
X
j=1
[p
j
(k)  p
j
(k   1)℄ ; J = 1; : : : ; N: (5)
This inequality states that the marginal \benet" in the probability distri-
bution by one additional eort is dereasing in k. To see that the \non-
inreasing marginal returns" implies ondition 2, replae k with T   k + l
and multiply the inequality (5) by l:
l
J
X
j=1
[p
j
(T   k + l + 1)  p
j
(T   k + l)℄  l
J
X
j=1
[p
j
(T   k + l)  p
j
(T   k + l   1)℄ ;
then by summing up both sides for l = 1; : : : ; k   1, we have
(k   1)
J
X
j=1
p
j
(T ) +
J
X
j=1
p
j
(T   k)  k
J
X
j=1
p
j
(T   1);
whih is equivalent to ondition 2.
11
10
Note that the ounterpart of ondition (ii) in Assumption 1 beomes an identity in this
extention sine two ation proles (a; : : : ; a; a) and (a; : : : ; a; a) yield the same distribution
p
i
(T   1) in the nal period T .
11
An independent related paper Kwon [4℄ investigates a similar model with binary out-
omes (N = 2) and shows that the optimal long-term ontrat is dependent only on
20
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1, we an show that the optimal long-term
ontrat is independent of outome history x
T 1
up to the period T   1, if
all inentive onstraints but
V (a; : : : ; a; a;w)  C  V (a; : : : ; a; a;w) (6)
are not binding. In the following we show that the derived ontrat, whih
is dependent only on the nal outome x
T
, automatially satises all the
inentive ompatibility onstraints.
As the derived ontrat w

satises (6) with equality, we have
C = V (a; : : : ; a; a;w

)  V (a; : : : ; a; a;w

): (7)
For eah k = 1; : : : ; T , substituting (7) into (IC
k
) yields
k  V (a; : : : ; a; a;w

)  (k   1)  V (a; : : : ; a; a;w

) + V (a
0
;w

):
This inequality is guaranteed to hold by the ondition 2.
6 Conluding Remarks
This paper has examined the role of history dependene in a dynami moral
hazard model. It is shown that, under ertain onditions on the probability
distributions of outomes, the optimal long-term ontrat is suh that the
payment shedules are not ontingent upon the realization of past outomes.
This nding lies in striking ontrast to the results in repeated moral hazard
models where the optimal long-term ontrats would generally be dependent
the nal outome under \non-inreasing marginal returns" assumption. Our result (Theo-
rem 3) inN -outome model is more general, and the weaker suÆient ondition is provided
with FOSD relationships. Kwon also presents empirial analysis using personnel reords
in a health insurane ompany, and the ndings are onsistent with the main feature of
derived optimal ontrat.
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on the whole history of past outomes.
We see a variety of irumstanes in reality where the eort has persistent
eets, and the result of the paper that the payments do not fully reet the
realization of past outomes under suh irumstanes is persuasive. How-
ever, the assumption of full ommitment may be too strong in some of these
eonomi ontexts. In the study of moral hazard problems, renegotiation-
proof ontrats have been investigated by Fudenberg and Tirole [2℄, Ma [6, 7℄,
and Park [10℄. In this respet, the study of dynami moral hazard would all
for further researh on renegotiation.
This paper has favored the simplest models to fous upon the role of
history dependene. In partiular, we have assumed two ations and in-
dependent distributions over periods in the paper. Generalizations of this
model also deserve further investigation.
Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide some mathematial arguments for footnote 8
in Setion 5.
Suppose that the agent is to make ations dependent on past outomes.
We an think of suh agent's strategy as a sequene of \behavior strategy"
suh as
 = (
1
; 
2
(x
1
); 
3
(x
1
; x
2
); : : : ; 
T
(x
1
; : : : ; x
T 1
));
where eah 
t
: f1; : : : ; Ng
t 1
! A is a mapping from the history of past
outomes (up to period t  1) to the ation in period t.
The problem in footnote 8 is whether the agent an improve his payo by
taking suh history-dependent strategy  (rather than history-independent
strategy a = (a
1
; a
2
; : : : ; a
T
)).
Theorem 4. If the ontrat is simple, then the agent annot improve by
taking history-dependent strategy .
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Proof. The expeted payo to the agent taking suh strategy  an be writ-
ten as
X
a2A
T
8
<
:
0

X
(x
1
;:::;x
T 1
)2I(a;)
T 1
Y
t=1
Pr[x
t
j 
t
(x
1
; : : : ; x
t 1
)℄
1
A

 
T 1
X
t=1
u(w
t
) +
N
X
j=1
p
T
j
(a)u(w
T
j
)  C m(a)
!)
(8)
where
I(a;) =

(x
1
; : : : ; x
T 1
) j 
t
(x
1
; : : : ; x
t 1
) = a
t
for t = 1; : : : ; T
	
;
that is, I(a;) is the set of history of outomes that ation prole a will be
played under strategy  with positive probability.
Sine every eah history (x
1
; : : : ; x
T 1
) generates exatly one ation prole
a given , the rst parentheses in (8) an be seen as a probability distribution
of a over A
T
; that is,
X
a2A
T
0

X
(x
1
;:::;x
T 1
)2I(a;)
T 1
Y
t=1
Pr[x
t
j 
t
(x
1
; : : : ; x
t 1
)℄
1
A
= 1 for any :
As the expeted value of random variables annot exeed the maximum of
the variables, we establish that
(8)  max
a2A
T
 
T 1
X
t=1
u(w
t
) +
N
X
j=1
p
T
j
(a)u(w
T
j
)  C m(a)
!
= max
a2A
T
(V (a;w)  C m(a)) :
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